The Supreme Court rejects the possibility that the administrative bodies sanctioned a travel organizer agency on the grounds of the delay of a flight, because the ius puniendi of the State is ruled by the principle of negligence of the offender, without it, it is not possible to accuse a person.
According to this judgment, the Additional Provision first of the law 21/1995 on combined trips establishes a punishing regime for the lack of compliance to the duties of organizers or retailers that have to respond to fraud or culpability of the subject accused “since there is no system of strict liability independent from the negligence at present, as it is clearly stated on the article 130 of the law 30/1992, of 26th November, on common administrative procedures”. Therefore the art. 11 of the law 21/1995 cannot be interpreted against those principles; this article does not establish a system of objective strict liability in the area of punishment, but refers to the civil liability of both, making possible that the consumer can claim damages against any of them without prejudice of the action of reimbursement of whoever pays against the real person who breach his duties. This is not opposed neither to art. 51 of the Constitution nor to the exposition of reasons of the aforementioned Law 21/1995, since the protection of the consumers which both declare is within the general limits that the code imposes to he administrative powers.
“This does not mean that the legal personality cannot be sanctioned for the non performance to their duties. The travel agencies as well as the transport companies or hotels, being individuals or legal entities, will be liable for the non performance of their duties, but their liability within the area for sanctions will be only if it is down to it the action that breaches the law”.
Texto completo: Texto completo